The Role of the Historian
According to Heidegger (by
David Kosalka)
In the wake of the collapse of modern philosophy and in its disastrous effects on the discipline of history, this discipline itself faces a crossroads of identity and purpose. The distillation of the supposed pure historical fact from the dialogue of history and the society which it serves has left the discipline vulnerable. Many historians perceive that their much beloved ideals are being torn apart by new interpretations and applications of historical thought. In such a time it is necessary for historians to redefine themselves philosophically to come to a common and consistent sense of purpose. The philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) gives both an explanation of the supposed crisis of history as well as giving a glimpse of the true power and purpose of history. It is through a Heideggerian lens, then, that the crisis can be understood and steps made towards a new role for the discipline.
To begin with, it is necessary to observe the development of the new "crisis" of history from within the discipline. According to the most traditional paradigm, history was to be a retelling of the central events of a historical drama. The historian Peter Burke found that the old history had these components: "According to the traditional paradigm history is essentially concerned with politics . . . traditional historians think of history as essentially a narrative of events . . .[and] traditional history offers a view from above."1 And as history was a view from above it was dominated by the idea of the "Great Man". In this view, history is forged by the elite, the Churchills, the DeGaulles, the Caesers and the Medici. Each was a unique individual and the art of history was the art of the narrative, of telling the story of the great men. On such and such a date, the old history would say, Cicero did this and saved the state of Rome by stopping the dreadful Cataline who was plotting this and that. History was also a form of didactic literature. The great men were models of characters that the rest of the society could emulate. The villains of the story showed us what kind of character to avoid. These men, events and the like became symbols that stood as icons painted by the respectful hands of the historian for men to venerate and follow.
This role of history was widely recognized by the classical historians
and was a driving thought behind their work. Livy in his Early History of
Rome he states the purpose of studying history. "The study of history
is the best medicine for a sick mind; for in history you have a record of the
infinite variety of human experience plainly set out for all to see; and in
that record you can find for yourself and your country both examples and
warnings; fine things to take as models, base things rotten through and
through, to avoid."2 This view continued on into the middle ages, having
gained a strong theological bent, through people like the Venerable Bede. In
the beginning of his great work he says "For if history records good
things of good men, the thoughtful hearer is encouraged to imitate what is
good: or if it records evil of wicked men, the devout, religious listener or
reader is encouraged to avoid all that is sinful and perverse and to follow
what he knows to be good and pleasing to God."3
This view dominated the writing of history until the forces of the
enlightenment began to change the conception of history and the role of the
historian. Following the lead of von Ranke (d. 1885) and others, history began
to aspire to the level of an empirical science, searching for the irrefutable
"truth" of what happened. No longer was the historian a literary
artist but instead was a scientist, testing his documents, using his sources
scrupulously so he could be certain of his result and come up with the definite
facts. These facts then, he believed, spoke on their own to the true meaning of
history. These revised facts of history were then discovered and formed a new
and supposedly improved historical narrative.4 Through the institutionalization
of the methods of von Ranke this view would quickly become the standard
methodological view of the discipline. However, this view was not without
problems. Despite the claims of impartiality, even this scientific mode of
history was corruptible and something as small as the selection and arrangement
of the historical "facts" could serve the biased motives of a
historian.
This was not the only challenge to the traditional narrative of history,
however, as the character of the old venerable icons and their ability to stand
as historical symbols for the entire society was called into question. The
established narrative was no longer acceptable, it could no longer stand
without taking into consideration the differences among all the groups of the
society. There came to be gender history, racial history, and ethnic history.
When these new areas of history were taken into account the idea of cultural
solidarity behind the symbols of history was like so many bundles of sticks
shoved through a chipper shredder.
This
disunity was further aggravated by the development, again from the more
scientific model that came with the rise of the social sciences, of more
structural histories. They would try to form theories and models to explain
historical phenomenon according to the scientific method. Historians began
viewing peoples' actions as a conglomerate and not just as individuals acting
out of the venerable concept of free will. People defined history in regard to
forces that theoretically could adequately explain people's actions, implying
that human behavior can be defined by scientific laws. As the most noted of
these force theories of history, Marxists see the force of economics driving
classes into conflict. Other people see actions as being defined by ideas such
as race, genetics, psychology, gender. This paradigm was further entrenched by
the advent of the computer and the advancement of statistics which quantified
demographic data to support the matrix of these theories. People began to study
what were once considered the brigands of history, the underclass and the most
ordinary of everyday experiences.
This then was the perplexed view from within the discipline. As people
pulled the historical narrative this way and that, to the eyes of the more
traditional, history was being stretched to a breaking point. Overall for the
profession, there is no sense of cohesion or unity in regard to purpose or
method even to the present day. This lack of a common understanding has brought
the discipline of history to a position which many historians regard as a
modern day identity crisis. As put by Burke: "In this expanding and
fragmenting universe, there is an increasing need for orientation."5
At a time of such rapid change and such widespread confusion as to the
direction and purpose of history, it is necessary to have, in a Heideggerian
sense, a clarion call of conscience for the discipline. As has always been the
case, what consists of history and what purpose history serves is related to
the dominant philosophies of the age. New types of history and new applications
of historical thought are often related to some philosophical school adapted by
a historian. Therefore, the clash in history is inseparable from the clash
within philosophical thought, experiencing the death rattles of modern
philosophy. What the historian needs to do, and the discipline as a whole needs
to do, is to take its philosophical bearings, and come to an agreement of
purpose with some sense of philosophical consistency.
There are actually several connections between history and philosophy in
the modern era that need to be explained. It is necessary to understand from
whence the methodological standards of the scientific mode of history arose.
This view of history has its origins in the enlightenment and an empirical
tradition, now most strongly associated with the natural sciences, that has a
high epistemological standard. In their book Telling the Truth About History,
Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob constantly refer to the effect of the "heroic
model of Science" for which the pursuit of supposed incontrovertible and
morally neutral facts was the goal. It was a search for the absolutes of
history which would theoretically allow the facts to speak for themselves.6
Facts were sought for the truth itself without a context of its usefulness for
a society and certainly not to satisfy an agenda of the historian. Indeed,
ideally the historian of this school sought to be completely anonymous in the
work. E. H Carr demonstrates such a viewpoint with the following anecdote;
The shorter Oxford English Dictionary, a useful but tendentious work of
the empirical school, clearly marks the separateness of the two processes by
defining fact as "a datum of experience as distinct from
conclusions." This is what may be called the common-sense view of history.
History consists of a corpus of ascertained facts. The facts are available to
the historian in documents, inscriptions, and so on, like fish on the
fishmonger's slab. The historian collects them, takes them home, and cooks and
serves them in whatever style appeals to him. Acton, whose culinary tastes were
austere, wanted them served plain. In his letter of instructions to the first
Cambridge Modern History he announced the requirement that our Waterloo must be
one that satisfies the French and English, German and Dutch alike; that nobody
can tell without examining the list of authors where the Bishop of Oxford laid
down the pen, and whether Fairbairn of Gasguet, Liebermann of Harrison took it
up.7
This kind of standard has a detrimental effect on the venerable icons of
history, an art whose subject is uncertain at the best of times. Paradoxically
because of the uncertainty of the alternatives this ideal was also the one that
historians would cling to in the attacks of the new history that sought to give
a broader perspective of representation to the discipline. The difficulties of
this high standard have been sufficiently demonstrated in philosophy8; however,
historians, unwilling to shift their focus, see these challenges as the loss of
the discipline itself. As these facts were distilled from the current cultural
discourse however it was the power of the historian to provide life and meaning
to the historical facts which was the gravest loss from this form of philosophical
thinking.
This
condition of the disembodiment of the historical facts from the historian's
context of interpretation originates in the method of enlightenment
philosophies like Descartes' which is the foundation of so much of modern
philosophy. Descartes in his Meditations attempted to prove the state of
the world a-priori, i.e. from an indisputable basis separate from the specific
empirical conditions of his environment. This effort of Descartes is
representative of modern philosophy's attempts to understand the world from
pure reason, in its confidence in our ability as human beings to understand the
thing in-itself from some kind of dis-interested standpoint. Heidegger and many
other of the post-modern philosophers would criticize our ability to pull
ourselves back from the world in such a fashion.9 The human consciousness in
the world is not able to be some kind of absolute narrator on the world around
us completely independent of its own interests and limitations. Rather, what is
at the heart of the Heideggerian phenomenology is the revelation that
being-in-the-world (Da-sein) is a fundamental being-with (mitsein), a being in
relation to that with which we live.10 Mankind is unable to completely separate
itself from its influences and the state of its "thrownness", the
mood and situation in which Da-sein finds itself.11 Therefore, the historian,
who is just a human after all, cannot separate himself from the simple
"facts" of history, but rather his perception of events of history
are always influenced by the biases, experience and preferences of the
historian.
This kind of conception has tremendous influence on fields like racial
history. It is not enough to have the singular perspective of history, because
it is influenced by the worldview of the historians themselves, the elite white
Protestant educated males. But if the historian and history itself are
influenced by cultural and perspective concerns that affect the individual
historian's interpretation, then there needs to be an analysis of the sets of
influences on all people as well as an examination of the influences on the
historians themselves in order to achieve the enlightenment goal of a narrative
which mirrors history in-itself, as it actually was. This view coincided with
an influx into the university of a more pluralistic pantheon of historians who
sought to express the views of their own culture, race, class, or even gender,
into the historical dialogue.12 Some go even so far as to express the idea that
only a black person could truly do black history, only a female can do proper
woman's history, etc. At the very least it seems a separate or a diverse
representation to portray these other perspectives is needed. How is a
historian to divide these categories and relate them to the comprehensive
narrative that modern history had worked so hard to develop? These questions
continue to plague the historian.
At the same moment there was a movement to disunity in the historical
narrative, in other ways there are movements to greater unity. In Heidegger's
conception of Da-sein, the primordial structure of being-in-the-world, it is
not the human independent of context, but it is the being-with that is
important. With such a philosophical perspective there arises a destruction of
the self as an identifiable independent entity. Da-sein encompasses both
subject and object, it is used to understand a conglomerate that are being with
each other.13 Men can then become parts of institutions or forces. Thus it
allows for the more structural histories that began to emerge. History is no
longer the clash of sovereign and undetermined individuals at the head of their
states, but history should be the clash of groups of differing structures of
being. The Marxist approach is again an example of this kind of historical
reasoning. History is dominated by the clash of the beings of different
classes. The differing worldviews of each class was responsible for the
conflict and the devastating results.
In this context it is interesting to note Heidegger's own nazi
connections. Indeed, many have argued that his nazi heritage was a direct
result of his philosophical constructs. While Heidegger had some fundamental
character flaws, his philosophy is both so influential and so powerful that one
can hardly be keen on saying that it automatically leads to a nazi politics.
But, in terms of his respect for the German people, this interpretation of
Da-sein as a more conglomerate entity can be very influential. When one
combines this interpretation with his notion of resoluteness it is a good match
for a Nazi phenomenon. With this in mind, however, it is important to remember
the nature of Heidegger's investigation. It was an attempt at a description of
fundamental ontology, to explain the nature of being itself, to understand the
nature of the phenomenon in the context of the legacy of Husserel. It is not a
philosophy of ethics. One philosophical thinker made the distinction clear with
the following anecdote:
Lowith observes that the "superb joke made up one day by a hearer of
Heidegger's lecture -- 'I am resolved; I just don't know upon what' -- was
received with unexpected seriousness" (pp. 162-63). It was indeed a good
joke, and Heidegger was a distinctly humorless man. But the seriousness with
which the joke was received was not wholly undeserved. Resoluteness, for
Heidegger, is a decision to become and remain awake and waitful in life. It is
not being waitful of any particular thing or awake for any particular purpose.
Resolute wakefulness is what Heidegger means by historicity.14
Indeed, it does not flow directly to nazism because it is not designed
for a particular worldview, but all forms of being-with. It is like putting up
the sails in expectation for any coming wind. But certainly the conglomerate
Da-sein allows for such a cultural and possibly racial history. It is therefore
a weapon to be used with utmost care. Indeed, one modern author stated the
dilemma this way:
Heidegger suggests that justification depends on resoluteness alone.
One's ethico-political principles or actions are of little import. Only upon
the resolute individual is the gift of Being bestowed. However, Luther's
attachment to faith was grounded in an object of faith -- the Christian God --
that was itself understood to be good. Heidegger's philosophic relation to
Being, in contrast, remains quite untethered to ethical categories. Perhaps for
this reason it was, when faced with a cultural and political crisis,
particularly susceptible to the allure of Nazism.15
Having examined a critical history of the history profession and having
come to an understanding of the philosophical history that has created and
reflects what is perceived as a crisis of the historical profession, it is
necessary to up the ante and present what ought to be the philosophy and
therefore the role of a historian. It is clear the concepts of the new history
need to be appropriated, but the important questions Heidegger raises for the
discipline are not so much a consideration of how history is constructed,
rather it should be carried a step deeper to an understanding of the role the
historian plays in society. Indeed, on one level the dispute is a result of the
unsettled question of the purpose of history. Hayden White makes this point as
part of his Metahistory. Early in the work he offers the following analysis:
Historiographical disputes on the level of "interpretation" are
in reality disputes over the "true" nature of the historian's
enterprise. History remains in the state of conceptual anarchy in which the
natural sciences existed during the sixteenth century, when there were as many
different conceptions of "the scientific enterprise" as there were
metaphysical positions. In the sixteenth century, the different conceptions of
what "science" ought to be ultimately reflected different conceptions
of "reality: and the different epistemologies generated by them. So, too,
disputes over what "history" ought to be reflect similarly varied
conceptions of what a proper historical explanation ought to consist of and
different conceptions, therefore, of the historian's task.16
Heidegger tells us that it is through an appropriation our past that we
become authentic, and can claim our possibilities. Through the phenomenon of
discourse we form a conception of ourselves out of the aspects of our historic
throwness so that we may resolutely define our possibilities.17 Who else is
better suited to do this on a societal level than the historian? Indeed,
especially in an American context the appropriation of history has played a
significant role in the every day lives of the inhabitants. The governmental
institutions were constructed on the assumption that history was evolving
towards the triumph of reason and democracy. The Americans can claim this
concept through an appropriate and interpretation of the past that provides for
this possibility. In the American constitutional heritage there is a great
emphasis on original intent as defining the possibilities of the constitutional
law. As the legal system reappropriates the meaning of the founders' ideas the
law fluctuates to encompass the new possibilities of legal action. On a broader
level, if the Heideggerian challenge is taken up in the years to come, the
historian is going to play a significant role in helping to redefine the
culture as the old assumptions seem to crumble and require a reappropriation.
The old school history of any age therefore is a large component of the
"They", the inherited paradigm that defines the presuppositions of a
culture, and has a tremendous influence on the human position as thrown. As the
they is challenged and reappropriated, that interpretation of history soon
becomes an orthodoxy and defines the possibilities for the age to come. It is,
therefore, as a culture of the "They" is challenged by some call of
conscience and reappropriated that the possibilities are redefined to form a
new paradigm. In the middle of this struggle for identity ought to be the
historian as the person most adept at creating, arranging, and explaining the
historical imagery that is at the heart of any societies understanding of
itself. The new reappropriations of society, which both stem from and then
become reflected in the symbolic language of history, involves a clear
co-dependent relationship between society and historical expression. It is
simply the nature of Da-sein, a cycle for every age in a great discovery of its
self, its being.
What then is the task of the historian? How is the historian to compose
his work in accordance with this new philosophical ideal? The first answer is
found in the classical use of historical discourse as described by the
venerable prophet of the post-modern age, Nietzsche. His essay "On the
Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life", the second in his Untimely
Meditations, presents a critical insight on the effects of the new
criterion for historical truth. He focuses on how the profession of history
being dominated by the standards of scientific inquiry have destroyed the
Classical connections between history and the purposes it serves for life as it
was found in people like Livy and Bede. Indeed, he says
And now let us quickly take a look at our own time! We are startled, we
shy away: where has all the clarity, all the naturalness and purity of this
relationship between life and history gone? In what restless and exaggerated
confusion does this problem now swell before our eyes! Does the fault lie with
us, who observe it? Or has the constellation of life and history really altered
through the interposition of a mighty, hostile star between them? Let others
show that we have seen falsely: for our part we shall say what we think we see.
And what we see is certainly a star, a gleaming and glorious star interposing
itself, the constellation really has been altered -- by science, by the demand
that history should be a science.18
In fact, he sees the ideal of history as a pure science as a dangerous
interpretation of the role of historian. For Nietzsche this concept disturbs
the traditional role history has played in the formation of a viable culture and
a common identity. In consequence he has harsh things to say about the academic
historians who follow strictly the scientific standards for history and
invalidate the cultural duties of historians. At one point he says:
But, as I have said, this a race of eunuchs, and to a eunuch one woman is
like another, simply a woman, woman in herself, the eternally unapproachable --
and it is thus a matter of indifference what they do so long as history itself
is kept nice and 'objective', bearing in mind that those who want to keep it so
are for ever incapable of making history themselves. And since the eternally
womanly will never draw you upward, you draw it down to you and, being neuters,
take history too for a neuter.19
Not only does he criticize the modern regime but he provides a vision
for what needs to be done in order in his mind to recover the lost balance
between history and life. That position was summarized in a recent article as
follows:
Retrospectively, the onset of the crisis of historicism might be
identified with the publication in 1874 of the second of Nietzsche's Untimely
Meditations, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life."
Here Nietzsche speaks of the malady of history that afflicts modern man,
draining him of his vital energies and burdening him with a life-numbing
memory. "a man who wanted to feel historically through and through,"
Nietzsche writes, "would be like one forcibly deprived of sleep20."
The extreme historical thinker would be condemned to see everywhere a state of
becoming. . . would no longer believe in his own being . . . would in the end
hardly dare to raise his finger" Nietzsche insists that history must be
made useful to life . . . But our making history useful to life is conditional
upon our learning to live "unhistorically" and
"suprahistorically". We need history to show us how and when it is
better to forgo the enervating burden of historical consciousness so that life
itself might be celebrated and greatness achieved in the here and now. History
, if it is to serve life, must be transformed into art, with all its strategic
forgetfulness.21
The historian has an essential duty to use history to set the cultural
debate for the rest of the society. But does it follow from this that the
discipline of history ought to be reduced to the writing of historical novels?
That seems to be Nietzsche's position. Upon reflection it seems regressive for
the department of history to be submerged into the fine arts college. Certainly
the purpose of a historical work is, in part at least, to be an elegant work of
literature, and a bit didactic at least in its result. However, the task of the
historian seems to be more than just painting an arbitrary picture of the past.
There does not seem to be a justification for the complete abandonment of a
standard of truth within the discipline. What the Nietzschean account reminds
the historian is that truthful accounts of history should not be an end in
themselves, but rather should be a guideline of the engagement between history
and life. This is the only proper means by which the discipline can justify its
existence.
This conception of the relationship of history to life is found
explicitly by concentrating on another of the ideas of Heidegger, the idea of
discourse (Rede).22 He argues that it is through discourse with the other that
we come to explain our position in the world. Discourse is, indeed, the
fundamental structure for our coming into an understanding of the nature of our
throwness.23 On a societal level, the components of history become primary
symbols for the language of that discourse. Historical events, people,
concepts, become the universally recognized symbols for relating ourselves to
our possibilities. The historians are the ones who should be defining these
symbols and composing with them to influence society.
There are some however who fear this significant power of the weapons
such conceptions of the historical narrative can produce, especially in
consideration of the ends for which it can be wielded. The largest cry among
those opposing post-modern views of history, and the kind of perspectivism it
entails, is that it seems to lead to an anarchical state of relativism the
likes of which historians have been battling for centuries. One modern
philosophical commentator in reviewing the effects of Heidegger's philosophy
and the nazi influence of the day made the following criticism:
Auschwitz exercises a more direct influence as well the ever-shifting
edifice of Postwar theory has been constructed by thinkers who either actively
collaborated with he Nazis (Heidegger and Paul de Man) or remained indifferent
to atrocity. The theories they formulated in the aftermath of the war, Hirsch
claims (with specific reference to Paul de Man), are "a useful device for
creating an intricate and elaborate set of evasions that would help him nullify
his own guilt-ridden past" (p 100). It is certainly convenient for anyone
who has committed gross transgressions to argue that 'value' is a fiction
designed to legitimate middle-class oppression of the lower classes. If words,
deconstructed, can be show to contain their opposites, then collaboration can
be - presto! - another form of resistance. If the synchronic excludes concern
with the diachronic, the forgetfulness of history is a virtue. If language
necessarily distorts, how can I be accountable for my particular lies? 24
Such an analysis is at the very least uncharitable to Heidegger and his
counterparts, at worse an unreflective reactionary backlash at his philosophy.
It does, however, demonstrate the modern school's fear of this new idea. It is
destroying their notion of history as the search for independent and universal
truths. The apparent irresolvable conflict of relativism seems to them to be
the worst kind of nihilism. Such arguments, however, are perhaps the last means
of defending an absolutist epistemological approach that is collapsing under
its own weight.
Not only is there a problem of the historian just making stuff up to
make his own picturesque version of history, there is the fear that everyone's
history will be their own. That my history, determined by my position in this
great labyrinth of being with, cannot be applicable to any other individual on
the planet. Where then does this leave the historian, who is supposedly some
kind of caretaker of the common history? If this view prevailed there could be
no interaction on a professional level among historians. However, this kind of
concern falls back again onto modern concepts. It is relying on the absolute
nature of the individual which can be separated from the environment.
Being-with and Da-sein are more expansive concepts than the individual. In
regard to historians then it would be studying the structure of being for a
community, however the forces of discourse in a society have defined it. Then,
in their relation to others of these structures of Da-sein, a coherent whole
can be derived. Thus each historian is not so independent that his work in some
way is influenced by his relation to others and not so dominated that he does
not add to the discourse. It relies on the understanding that the historian
does not purposefully lie or ignore the historical evidence, but rather he
should not be afraid to use it to his own interpretation and to the benefit of
his community.
History needs a thorough revaluation of the overall dilemma. An
indication of this is outlined with the comment "Heidegger explains that
"philosophy will never discover what history is as long as it analyzes it
as an object, in terms of a method. The enigma of history lies in what it means
to be historical."25 Just as Da-sein for Heidegger is awakened with the
experience of nothingness and the call of conscience, so too must history be
awakened from this nightmare. The historian needs to become again authentic and
realize that the issues and duties which seem to conflict in the standard
interpretation are false dichotomies. The historian's job is to look at all the
evidence and derive the vision he can from that to form the possibilities of
her existence. To ignore some of the evidence as Nietzsche seems to suggest is
to be inauthentic to our being in the world. Historians must examine being
completely. In this the historian defines this being for his fellow humanity.
Indeed "'The question of how it stands with Being proves to be the
question of how it stands with our being-there in history, the question of
whether we stand in history or merely stagger' The degree of our openness to
temporal Being-in-the-world determines whether we are truly living historically
-- that is, living our historicity with resoluteness."26 This then is the
object of historical analyses according to Heidegger.
Certainly this concept seems to the old epistemological standards to
flirt with the edge of the abyss of relativity in the worst sense, but when the
old standards are removed it is clear that this is the only path for
understanding that can be taken. Indeed, the historian in this context, while
he certainly might employ some of the tools of the old scientific historical
methods, is not a scientist, but rather a humanist, as well as a poet and a
philosopher; not one who runs from the past, but who takes her position as
being in the world to create the context of life which is necessarily in a
historical context. It is an essential task to be performed with any age to
understand its own possibilities and to break out of an outdated historical
"They" culture. The historical facts then are the tools of the
historian and not independent aims of his craft.
That is not to say that the gap between history and life has gone
completely unnoticed in the current curriculum. If there is one area that has
made explicit note of the common uses of history and the far different academic
pursuit it has been those who have studied public memory. While at the moment
these theorists still maintain an artificial divide between academic history
and public history, they recognize the power of historical symbolism in society
for determining identity and defining culture. This symbolism of history is a
substantial component of the language of discourse for the appropriation of
history on a public level. This kind of recognition is the initial attempt to
bridge the gap that has been left by academic history. One commentator on
public history in fact argues that it is essential to a revitalization of the
historical profession: "Moreover, public historians are well positioned to
contribute to this scholarship. The insights the first-hand knowledge of how
historical knowledge is created, institutionalized, disseminated, and
understood can help revitalize the entire historical profession as it redefines
itself both professionally and intellectually in the years ahead."27 The
first step to a cure is to admit you have a problem. Public memory will help
serve the purpose of explicating the gap that exists and then the task is to
destroy it.
Thus are both the problem and a possible solution to the problem of
modern history derived from the historical narrative and the ideas of
Heidegger. There are lots of diligent old School historians trying yet to patch
up and bail out the old ship but it is becoming increasingly apparent that it
simply will no longer do. The vision of Heidegger stands out as a possible
means of interpretation for this explosion, as well as a reassurance, that
while historian need new boats to navigate the post-modern waters, it is a
cohesive system, if one that is extremely different from the ones of the past.
And, indeed, the historian is to play an important role for redefining culture
and reappropriating the past to meet the needs of our present and future
possibilities. The gap and the ivory towers of academic history that separates
it from the real power of history for life must be destroyed. To do this is
essential for the well being of culture and world.
Notes
1. Peter Burke, New Perspectives on Historical
Writing (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1995) pp 3-4.
2.
Livy, The Early
History of Rome (London: Penguin Books, 1971), p 34.
3.
The Venerable Bede, Ecclesiastical
History of the English People (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p 41.
4.
Mark T. Gilderhus, History
and the Historians: A Historiographical Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996), pp 47-48.
5.
Burke, p 2.
6.
Joyce Appleby, Lynn
Hunt and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth About History (New York: W.
W. Norton & Company, 1995), pp 15-90.
7.
Edward Hallett Carr, What
is History (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 6.
8.
Martin Heidegger, The
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1992).
9.
Martin Heidegger, Being
and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: State University of New York
Press, 1996), pp 88-94.
10. Stephen Mulhall, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to
Heidegger and Being and Time (London: Routledge, 1996), pp 65-74.
11. Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A
Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995), p 173.
12. Appleby, pp 146-148.
13. Dreyfus, pp 141-162.
14. Leslie Paul Thiele, "Heidegger, History, and
Hermeneutics," The Journal of Modern History 69 (1997): 543.
15. Thiele, p 546.
16. Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical
Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1973) p 13
17. Dreyfus, p 328.
18. Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p 77.
19. Nietzsche, p 86.
20. What does he mean like one? I am forcibly deprived of
sleep!
21. Thiele, p 535.
22. Mulhall, pp 90-104.
23. Being and Time, pp 123-164.
24. Peter J. Leithart, "Heidegger
Deconstructed", Contra Mundum 13 (1994) at
http://wwww.wavefront.com/~contra_m/cm/reviews/cm13_rev_heidegger.html(accessed
on 22 November 1997 6:09 p.m.)
25. Thiele, p 544.
26. Thiele, p 560.
27. David Glassberg. "Public History and the Study
of Memory", The Public Historian, vol. 18 n 2 (Spring 1996): 8.